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Pension Issues in Japan
How Can We Cope with the 
Declining Population?
Noriyuki Takayama
5.1    Introduction
Japan already has the oldest population in the world. It has built generous 
social security programs. In 2002 the income statement of the principal pro-
gram of social security pensions moved into deﬁ  cit and its balance sheet has 
continued to suﬀer from huge excess liabilities. This has been accompanied 
by a growing distrust of the government’s commitment on public pensions 
and increased concern with the incentive-  compatibility problem. The 2004 
pension reforms went some way toward addressing these issues.
This chapter uses a balance sheet approach to describe the current ﬁ  nan-
cial performance of social security pensions in Japan, and analyzes the im-
pact of the recent reform measures.
The balance sheet approach was ﬁ  rst used about 700 years ago in Italy 
and since then has become one of the two major accounting tools. However, 
it has been underutilized for public policy analyses.
Beneﬁ  ts of the balance sheet approach include: ﬁ  rst, that it describes the 
current ﬁ  nancial status in stock terms by presenting assets and liabilities 
with their compositions; second, it implies how smoothly future ﬁ  nancing 
will be carried out; and third, it makes clear the impacts of alternative policy 
measures on future ﬁ  nancing.
Before going into a discussion on the design ﬂ  aws of Japanese pensions, 
some remarks have to be made on their implementation issues, since there 
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arose a serious pension record-  keeping problem in Japan from May 2007. 
Namely, around 50 million pension records of social security are found to 
be ﬂ  oating, not being integrated to the uniﬁ  ed speciﬁ  c pension numbers. 
The pending records are due to human errors made by enrollees, their em-
ployers, and agencies. There has been no integrated collection of taxes and 
social security contributions in Japan, and additionally no monitoring or-
ganizations have been eﬀectively implemented in the ﬁ  eld of pension admin-
istration. Government oﬃcials in Japan used to be regarded as the best 
and brightest, and thus too much reliance on bureaucracy was observed 
in the past. The general public were under the illusion that government of-
ﬁ  cials were able to do and did everything correctly without committing any 
errors. However, human errors are inevitable anywhere. Regular and prompt 
examinations over possible errors are required for proper record- keeping of 
pensions. Upon any no-  match identiﬁ  ed, a two-  way notiﬁ  cation and con-
ﬁ  rmation with correction should follow in due course. The trustworthy gov-
ernment with its competent and neat implementation is, thus, the basis for 
any pension system.
This chapter begins with a brief sketch of the Japanese demography and 
its impact on ﬁ  nancing social security. It then explains the Japanese social 
security pension program and summarizes Japan’s major pension problems. 
It further examines the 2004 pension reform and uses the balance sheet 
approach to analyze its economic implications. The chapter discusses future 
policy options on pensions, as well.
5.2      Demography and Its Impact on Financing Social Security
In December 2006, the Japanese National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research (NIPSSR) released its latest population projec-
tions. These indicated that the total population will peak at 128 million in 
2004 and then will begin to fall steadily, decreasing to about 50 percent of 
the current number by 2080.
The total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.26 in 2005 and there is little sign that it 
will stabilize or return to a higher level. The 2006 medium variant projections 
assume that it will record the historical low of 1.21 in 2013 and will gradually 
rise to 1.26 around 2050, remaining unchanged at 1.26 thereafter. The num-
ber of births in 2005 was about 1.06 million and will continue to decrease to 
less than 1.0 million by 2008, falling further to 0.49 million in 2050.
Because it has the world’s longest life expectancy,1 Japan is now expe-
riencing a very rapid aging of its population. The number of the elderly 
(sixty- ﬁ  ve years and above) was 25.8 million in 2005. This will increase 
sharply to reach 36 million by 2020, remaining around 36 to 39 million 
thereafter until around 2060. Consequently the proportion of the elderly 
1. Further declining mortality is almost ignored by the NIPSSR projections. Things will be 
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(sixty- ﬁ  ve years and above) will go up very rapidly from 20.2 percent in 2005 
to 30 percent by 2023, rising further to more than 40 percent by 2052. Japan 
already has one of the oldest populations in the world.
In Japan, around 70 percent of social security beneﬁ  ts are currently dis-
tributed to the elderly. Along with the ailing domestic economy, the rapid 
population aging will certainly put increased stresses on the ﬁ  nancing of 
social security.
In May 2006 the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare published the 
latest estimates of the cost of social security just after the 2006 health care 
reform, using the 2002 population projections of the NIPSSR. According 
to these estimates, the aggregate cost of social security was 17.5 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006. This is expected to steadily increase 
to 19.0 percent by 2025.2
5.3      Japanese Pension Provisions before the 2004 Reform
Since 1980, Japan has undertaken piecemeal pension reforms every ﬁ  ve 
years, mainly due to great stresses caused by anticipated demographic and 
economic factors. This has resulted in a step by step reduction in the gener-
ous pension beneﬁ  ts, an increase of the normal pensionable age from sixty 
to sixty-  ﬁ  ve, and an increase in the pension contribution rate. Yet, in 2004, 
the pension provisions still remained generous and the system seemed likely 
to face serious ﬁ  nancial diﬃculties in the future.
Japan currently has a two-  tier beneﬁ  t system. All sectors of the popu-
lation receive the ﬁ  rst-  tier, ﬂ  at- rate basic beneﬁ  t. The second- tier earnings-
 related  beneﬁ  t applies only to employees.3 The system operates largely like 
a  Pay- As- You- Go  (PAYGO)  deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t program.
The ﬂ  at-  rate basic pension covers all residents aged twenty to sixty. A 
minimum twenty-  ﬁ  ve-  year contribution is required to receive an old-  age 
beneﬁ  t. The full old-  age pension is payable after forty years of contribu-
tions, provided the contributions were made before sixty years of age. The 
maximum monthly pension of 66,000 yen (in 2008 prices) per person is 
payable from age sixty-  ﬁ  ve.4 This beneﬁ  t was indexed annually to reﬂ  ect 
changes in the consumer price index (CPI). The pension may be claimed at 
any age between sixty and seventy years and is subject to actuarial reduc-
tion if claimed before age sixty-  ﬁ  ve, or actuarial increase if claimed after 
sixty- ﬁ  ve years.
Earnings- related  beneﬁ  ts are given to all employees. The accrual rate 
2. Of the various social security costs, that of pensions is predominant, amounting to 9.2 
percent of GDP in 2006, with an expected decrease to 8.7 percent by 2025 after the 2004 
reform. The cost for health care is 5.4 percent in 2006, but is projected to steadily rise to 6.4 
percent by 2025.
3. A detailed explanation of the Japanese social security pension system is given by Takayama 
(1998, 2003).
4. 1,000 yen  US$10.59  Euro7.50  UK £6.42, as of 19 August 2009.170    Noriyuki  Takayama
for the earnings-  related component of old-  age beneﬁ  ts was 0.5481 percent 
per year; forty years’ contributions would thus earn 28.5 percent of career 
average monthly real earnings.5
The career-  average monthly earnings are calculated over the employee’s 
entire period of coverage, adjusted by a net- wage index factor, and converted 
to the current earnings level. The full earnings-  related pension is normally 
payable from age sixty- ﬁ  ve to an employee who is fully retired.6 An earnings 
test is applied to those who are not fully retired. The current replacement 
rate (including basic beneﬁ  ts) for take-  home pay or net income is about 
60 percent for a typical male retiree (with an average salary earned during 
forty years of coverage) and his dependent wife. This translates to a monthly 
beneﬁ  t of about 233,000 yen in 2008.
Equal percentage contributions are required from employees and their 
employers. The contributions are based on annual standard earnings, in-
cluding bonuses. Before the 2004 reforms, the total contribution rate for 
the principal program for private-  sector employees (Kosei Nenkin Hoken, 
KNH), was 13.58 percent. Nonemployed persons between the ages of twenty 
to sixty years paid ﬂ  at-  rate individual contributions. The 2004 rate since 
April 1998 was 13,300 yen per month. And those who cannot pay for ﬁ  nan-
cial reasons are exempt. The ﬂ  at- rate basic beneﬁ  ts for the period of exemp-
tion were one-  third of the normal amount.
Moreover, if the husband has the pension contribution for social security 
deducted from his salary, his dependent wife is automatically entitled to the 
ﬂ  at-  rate basic beneﬁ  ts, and she is not required to make any individual pay-
ments to the public pension system.
The government subsidized one-  third of the total cost of the ﬂ  at-  rate 
basic beneﬁ  ts plus administrative expenses. There is, however, no subsidy 
for the earnings-  related part. All social security pension contributions are 
tax- deductible, while overwhelming parts of their beneﬁ  ts are virtually tax-
 exempt.
For 2004 the aggregate amount of social security pension beneﬁ  ts is esti-
mated at around 46 trillion yen, or about 9 percent of GDP.7
5.4      Some Basic Facts on Pensions
Any pension reform proposal must take into account the current basic 
facts on social security pensions. Of these, the following ﬁ  ve are especially 
crucial.
5. A semiannual bonus equivalent to 3.6 months salary is typically assumed.
6. The normal pensionable age of the KNH is sixty-  ﬁ  ve, though Japan has special arrange-
ments for a transition period between 2000 and 2025. See Takayama (2003) for more details.
7. Almost all Japanese employees receive occupational pensions and/ or lump- sum retirement 
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5.4.1    A  Persistent  Deﬁ  cit in the Income Statement
Since 2002, the pension scheme for private sector employees (KNH) has 
been facing an income statement deﬁ  cit. It recorded a deﬁ  cit of 1.3 trillion 
yen in 2002, increasing to 9.8 trillion yen in 2005. It is estimated that this 
deﬁ  cit will persist for a long time, unless radical remedies are made in the 
KNH ﬁ  nancing.
5.4.2      Huge Excess Liabilities in the Balance Sheet
The KNH balance sheet is shown in table 5.1. In calculating the balance 
sheet, it was assumed that: the annual increases in wages and the CPI were 
2.1 percent and 1.0 percent respectively, nominal, while the discount rate was 
3.2 percent annually; and the 2003 contribution rate of the KNH of 13.58 
percentage points would remain unchanged over the projection period (to 
the year 2100).
Table 5.1 indicates that, as at the end of March 2005, excess liabilities of 
the KNH are estimated at 550 trillion yen, which is a quarter of the total 
liabilities.8
The balance sheet set out in table 5.1 has two parts. Part One illustrates 
the assets and liabilities accrued from past contributions, while Part Two 
refers to assets and liabilities accrued from future contributions.9 It can be 
seen that as far as Part Two is concerned, any excess liabilities are almost 
eliminated. That is, the funding sources of the current provisions will be 
suﬃcient to ﬁ  nance future beneﬁ  ts. Here the only task left is to slim down 
future beneﬁ  ts by 4.5 percent.
But if we look at Part One of the balance sheet, things appear quite 
diﬀerent. The remaining pension liabilities are estimated to be 800 trillion 
yen, while pension assets are only 300 trillion yen (comprising a funded 
reserve of 170 trillion yen plus transfers from general revenue of 130 trillion 
yen). The diﬀerence is quite large, about 500 trillion yen,10 which accounts 
for most of the excess liabilities in the KNH and is equivalent to about 100 
percent of GDP of Japan in 2004.
In the past, too many pension promises were made, while suﬃcient fund-
ing sources had not been arranged. As a result, the Japanese have enjoyed 
a long history of generous social security pensions. However, contributions 
8. Excess liabilities of all social security pension programs in Japan as at the end of March 
2005 amounted to around 650 trillion yen, which is equivalent to 1.3 times the year 2004 GDP 
of Japan.
9. The balance sheet approach is slightly diﬀerent from the generational accounting one, 
which is initiated by L. Kotlikoﬀ.
10. The amount of excess liabilities (EL) will vary depending on alternative discount rates. 
For example, a 2.1 percent discount rate induces EL of 650 trillion yen, while another 4.0 per-
cent discount rate produces EL of 420 trillion yen. Part One excess liabilities can be termed as 
“accrued-  to-  date net liabilities” or “net termination liabilities.” See Franco (1995) and Holz-
mann, Palacios, and Zviniene (2004).172    Noriyuki  Takayama
made in the past were relatively small, resulting in a fairly small funded 
reserve. Consequently, the focus of the true crisis in Japanese social security 
pensions is how to handle the excess liabilities of 500 trillion yen representing 
entitlements from contributions made in the past.
5.4.3      The Heavy Burden of Pension Contributions
In Japanese public policy debates, one of the principal issues has been how 
to cut down personal and corporate income tax. But recently the situation 
has changed drastically. Social security contributions (for pensions, health 
care, unemployment, work injury, and long-  term care) were 55.6 trillion 
yen (11.2 percent of GDP) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, more than all tax rev-
enues (43.9 trillion yen) of the central government for the same year. Since 
1998, the central government has received more revenue from social security 
contributions than from tax on incomes; FY 2003 revenue from personal 
income tax was 13.8 trillion yen and from corporate income tax 9.1 trillion 
yen, while revenue from social security pension contributions stood at 29.0 
trillion yen. As a result, many Japanese now feel that the burden of social 
security pension contributions is far too heavy and employers have begun 
to express serious concerns about any further increases in social security 
contributions.
5.4.4      Overshooting the Income Transfer between Generations
Currently, in Japan the elderly are better oﬀ than those aged thirty to 
forty- four in terms of per capita income after redistribution (see Takayama 
[1998, 126] for more details). This amazing fact suggests that current pension 
Table 5.1  Balance sheet of the KNH before reform as of 31 March 2005
       Trillion yen 
1. Part one
Assets
  Financial  reserves 170
    Transfers from general revenue 130
Liabilities




  Contributions 920
    Transfers from general revenue 130
Liabilities
    Pensions due to future contributions 1,100
  Excess liabilities   50  
Note: The author’s own calculation.Pension Issues in Japan    1 7 3
beneﬁ  ts may be too generous and there is still room for reduction in beneﬁ  ts 
provided to the current retired population (which would address the excess 
liabilities indicated by the balance sheet).
5.4.5      An Increasing Drop-  Out Rate
In the past thirty years, the Japanese government has made repeated 
changes to the pension program, increasing social security pension con-
tributions and reducing beneﬁ  ts through raising the normal pensionable 
age while reducing the accrual rate. Similar piecemeal reforms are likely to 
continue into the future.
Many Japanese feel that the government is breaking its promise. As dis-
trust of the government’s pension commitment builds up, nonparticipation 
is growing.
In 2007, 54 percent of nonsalaried workers and persons with no occupa-
tions dropped out from the basic level of old-  age income protection, owing 
to exemption or failure to pay contributions (see ﬁ  gure 5.1). Any further 
escalation in the social security contribution rate will surely induce a higher 
drop- out  rate.11
5.5      The 2004 Pension Reform: Main Features and Remaining Diﬃculties
The administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro ¯ submitted a set 
of pension reform bills to the National Diet on February 10, 2004. These 
11. Integrated collection of social security pension and health care contributions can reduce 























Fig. 5.1    Drop-  out from social security pensions (category 1 nonemployees), delin-
quency in paying pension contributions
Source: Social Insurance Agency, Japan.174    Noriyuki  Takayama
were enacted on June 5. This section will describe the gist of the approved 
reforms and explore issues that remain to be addressed.12
5.5.1    Increases  in  Contributions
Salaried workers are, as a rule, enrolled in the KNH, which is part of the 
public pension system. Contributions under this plan had since October 
1996 been set at 13.58 percent of annual income, paid half by the worker 
and half by the employer. The newly enacted reforms raised this rate by 
0.354 percentage points in October 2004. The rate will rise every September 
thereafter by the same amount until 2017, after which it will remain ﬁ  xed at 
18.30 percent of annual income. The portion paid by workers will accord-
ingly rise to 9.15 percent of annual income.
For an “average” male company employee earning 360,000 yen a month 
plus an annual bonus equivalent to 3.6 months’ pay, total contributions 
will increase by nearly 20,000 yen a year starting from October 2004, and 
by the time they stop rising in September 2017, they will have reached just 
under 1.03 million yen a year (of which the share paid by the worker will be 
just over 514,000 yen, or 35 percent more than the 2004 level of contribu-
tions).
Those who are not enrolled in the KNH or other public pension schemes 
for civil servants are required to participate in the National Pension plan 
(Kokumin Nenkin, KN), which provides the so-  called basic pension only 
(the basic pension also forms the ﬁ  rst tier of beneﬁ  ts under the KNH and 
other public pension systems for civil servants). Contributions under this 
plan will rise by 280 yen each April, from 13,300 yen per month in 2004 until 
they plateau at 16,900 yen (at 2004 prices) in April 2017. The actual rise in 
National Pension contributions will be adjusted according to increases in 
general wage levels.
In addition, the government will increase its subsidies for the basic pen-
sion. Currently one-  third of the cost of basic pension beneﬁ  ts is paid from 
the national treasury; this share is to be raised in stages until it reaches 
one-  half in 2009.
5.5.2    Reductions  in  Beneﬁ  ts
Beneﬁ  ts under the KNH consist of two tiers; the ﬂ  at-  rate basic pen-
sion, which is paid to all public pension plan participants, and a separate 
earnings-  related component. The latter is calculated on the basis of the 
worker’s average preretirement income, converted to current values. Until 
now, the index used to convert past income to current values was the rate 
of increase in take- home pay. Under the recently enacted reforms, however, 
this index is subject to a negative adjustment over a transition period based 
on changes in two demographic factors—the decline in the number of par-
12. This section draws heavily on Takayama (2004).Pension Issues in Japan    1 7 5
ticipants and the increase in life expectancy. This period of adjustment is 
expected to last through to 2023.
The application of the ﬁ  rst demographic factor means that beneﬁ  t levels 
will be cut to reﬂ  ect the fact that fewer people are supporting the pension sys-
tem. The actual number of people enrolled in all public pension schemes will 
be ascertained each year, and the rate of decline will be calculated based on 
this ﬁ  gure. The average annual decline is projected to be around 0.6 points.
The second demographic factor will adjust for the fact that people are 
living longer and thus collecting their pensions for more years; the aim is 
to slow the pace of increase in the total amount of beneﬁ  ts paid as a result 
of increased longevity. This factor will not be calculated by tracking future 
movements in life expectancy; instead, it has been set at an annual rate of 
about 0.3 percentage points on the basis of current demographic projections 
for the period through 2025. Together, the two demographic factors are thus 
expected to lead to a negative adjustment of about 0.9 points a year during 
the period in question.
How will these changes aﬀect people’s actual retirement beneﬁ  ts? Let 
us consider the case of a pair of “typical” KNH beneﬁ  ciaries as deﬁ  ned 
by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare: a sixty-  ﬁ   ve- year- old  man 
who earned the average wage throughout his forty- year career and his sixty-
 ﬁ ve-  year-  old wife who was a full-  time homemaker for forty years from her 
twentieth birthday. In FY 2004, this typical couple would receive 233,000 
yen a month.
How does this amount compare to what employees are currently taking 
home? The average monthly income of a salaried worker in 2004 was around 
360,000 yen, before taxes and social insurance deductions. Assuming that 
this is supplemented by bonuses totaling an equivalent of 3.6 months’ pay, 
the average annual income is roughly 5.6 million yen. Deducting 16 percent 
of this ﬁ  gure for taxes and social insurance payments leaves a ﬁ  gure for 
annual take-  home pay of about 4.7 million yen, or 393,000 yen a month.
The 233,000 yen provided to the typical pensioners is 59.3 percent of 
393,000 yen. However, under the 2004 reforms this percentage, or replace-
ment rate, will gradually decline to an estimated ﬁ  gure of 50.2 percent by FY 
2023 (assuming that consumer prices and nominal wages rise according to 
government projections by 1.0 percent and 2.1 percent a year, respectively). 
Over the next two decades, then, beneﬁ  t levels are projected to decline by 
roughly 15 percent by comparison with wage levels.
The revised pension legislation stipulates that the income replacement rate 
is not to fall below 50 percent for the typical case previously described, so 
the transition period of negative adjustment will come to an end once the 
replacement rate declines to 50 percent. This provision was included to alle-
viate fears that retirement beneﬁ  ts would continue to shrink without limit.
How will the reforms aﬀect those who are already receiving their pensions? 
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for ﬂ  uctuations in the consumer price index. This ensured that pensioners’ 
real purchasing power remained unchanged and helped ease postretirement 
worries. But this cost-  of-  living link will eﬀectively be severed during the 
transition period, since the application of the demographic factors will pull 
down real beneﬁ  ts by around 0.9 points a year. In principle, however, nomi-
nal beneﬁ  ts are not to be cut unless there has also been a drop in consumer 
prices. Once the transition period is over, the link to the consumer price 
index is to be restored.
5.5.3      Changes to Provisions for Working Seniors and Divorcees
People aged sixty to sixty- four who were receiving pensions and also had 
wage income had their beneﬁ  ts reduced by a ﬂ  at 20 percent, regardless of 
how much or little they earned. This rule was abolished in the 2004 reforms 
so as not to discourage older people from working. However, these older 
workers will still be subject to the previous rule that if the sum of wages and 
pension beneﬁ  ts exceeds 280,000 yen a month (after factoring in annual 
bonuses), the pension beneﬁ  ts are to be cut by 50 percent of the amount in 
excess of this level.
Workers aged seventy and over, meanwhile, have been exempt from paying 
into the KNH, even if they are still on a company’s payroll. And they did 
not have their beneﬁ  ts reduced no matter how much they earned. Beginning 
in April 2007, however, their beneﬁ  ts are reduced if they are high-  income 
earners. Those receiving more than an equivalent of 480,000 yen a month 
in wages and pension beneﬁ  ts will have their beneﬁ  ts cut by 50 percent of 
the amount in excess of this level. This is a rule that currently applies to 
those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  nine, as well. The over-  seventy group will still 
be entitled to the full amount of the basic pension, and they will continue 
to be exempt from paying contributions.
Divorced wives were not legally entitled to any portion of their former 
husbands’ earnings-  related pension beneﬁ  ts, but this changed under the 
2004 reforms. Couples who divorce after April 2007 are able to split the 
rights to the earnings- related portion of the husband’s pension that accrued 
during their marriage. The wife is able to receive a share of up to 50 percent 
of these rights with the actual share to be determined by agreement between 
the two. For rights accruing after April 2008, moreover, a full-  time home-
maker is able to automatically receive half of her husband’s beneﬁ  ts in case 
of divorce by ﬁ  ling a claim at a social insurance oﬃce. Underlying this rule 
is the assumption that even though the contributions are paid in the hus-
band’s name, the wife has provided half of the couple’s livelihood through 
her work as a homemaker.13
13. The provisions for working husbands and dependent homemaker wives apply conversely 
in cases where a homemaker husband is dependent on the wife.Pension Issues in Japan    1 7 7
5.5.4    Improved  Survivors’  Beneﬁ  ts and Child-  Raising Concessions
Until now, widowed spouses younger than thirty and without children 
under the age of eighteen have been entitled to lifelong beneﬁ  ts under the 
survivor’s pension scheme (based on the earnings of the deceased spouse). 
After April 2007, however, they receive beneﬁ  ts for no longer than ﬁ  ve 
years.
Workers taking child care leave are exempt from making pension contri-
butions, and to prevent a decrease in their future beneﬁ  ts due to this period 
of nonpayment, they are treated as having continued their full payments, 
even when they have no income. This special exemption can now be claimed 
for up to one year after childbirth, but starting in April 2005 the period is 
extended until the child reaches age three.
Also, from April 2005, parents who change their working arrangements 
to put in shorter hours so as to care for children under age three and who 
take a corresponding cut in pay are treated as having worked full time and 
earned a full salary. Actual contributions during this three-  year period, 
though, are based on the lower earnings.
5.5.5      Other Public and Private Pension Reforms
As a rule, a person cannot simultaneously receive more than one public 
pension. But the recent reforms have created an exception. People with dis-
abilities who had gainful employment and paid pension contributions are, 
from April 2006, entitled to not only their basic disability pension but also 
the earnings-  related component of the old-  age pension or survivor’s pen-
sion. This measure is designed to encourage greater employment among 
these people.
Participants in the National Pension plan who had low incomes paid 
either half of the regular contributions or none at all. There is a ﬁ  ner tuning 
of payment exemptions starting in July 2006, when low- income earners may 
also be exempt from paying one-  quarter or three-  quarters of the regular 
contributions.
Also, the administrative processes are improved and streamlined. In the 
past, pension plan participants found out how much they would receive in 
beneﬁ  ts only by going to a social insurance oﬃce with their pension pass-
 books after they had reached age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve. From April 2008, however, such 
information is disclosed to all contributors each year, along with their pay-
ment records.
The reforms cover private pension plans as well. From October 2004, the 
upper limit of the amount that can be put aside each month under company-
 funded  deﬁ  ned contribution pension plans was raised from 36,000 yen to 
46,000 yen in cases where there is no other corporate pension plan, and from 
18,000 yen to 23,000 yen where there is another plan in eﬀect. The ceiling 
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plans for salaried workers was raised from 15,000 yen to 18,000 yen where 
there is no corporate pension coverage, while the cap for the self-  employed 
remained unchanged at 68,000 yen. The higher ceilings for private plans are 
designed to make up for the anticipated smaller beneﬁ  ts of public old-  age 
schemes.
5.5.6      Is the 2004 Reform Incentive-  Compatible?
Social insurance contributions in Japan already exceed the amount col-
lected in national taxes, and contributions to the pension system are by far 
the biggest social insurance item. If this already huge sum is increased by 
more than 1 trillion yen a year, as the government plans, both individuals 
and companies are very likely to change their behavior. Government projec-
tions of revenues and expenditures, though, completely ignore the prospect 
of such change.
It is possible that companies will reconsider their hiring plans and wage 
scales to avoid the higher social insurance burden. They may cut back on 
recruitment of new graduates and become more selective about midcareer 
hiring as well. Many young people will be stripped of employment oppor-
tunities and driven out of the labor market, instead of being enlisted to 
support the pension system with a percentage of their income. As well, the 
employment options for middle- aged women who wish to reenter the work-
force will be reduced and, as only a few older workers will be able to continue 
commanding high wages, there is likely to be a dramatic rise in the number 
of aging workers who will be forced to choose between remaining on the 
payroll with a cut in pay or settling for retirement. It is possible that many 
more companies will either choose or be forced to leave the KNH, causing 
the number of subscribers to fall far below the government’s projections and 
pushing the system closer to bankruptcy.
If these events come to fruition, the jobless rate on the whole could rise. 
The Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry has estimated that 
higher pension contributions could lead to the loss of 1 million jobs and 
boost the unemployment rate by 1.3 percentage points.
The government plan to increase pension contributions annually for 
the next ten years will therefore exert ongoing deﬂ  ationary pressure on the 
Japanese economy. For the worker, a rise in contribution levels means less 
take-  home pay; as a result, consumer spending is likely to fall, and this 
will surely hinder prospects for an economic recovery and return to steady 
growth, which is one of the most important factors for Japan to make social 
security sustainable.
Another problem with increasing pension contributions is that they are 
regressive, since there is a ceiling for the earnings on which payment calcu-
lations are based and unearned income is not included in the calculations 
at all.
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huge excess liabilities in the balance sheet of the KNH. The plan is to gen-
erate a surplus by (a) increasing contributions; (b) increasing payments 
from the national treasury; and (c) reducing beneﬁ  ts. The policy measures 
adopted in the 2004 pension reform bill will induce huge excess assets of 420 
trillion yen in Part Two of the balance sheet while oﬀsetting excess liabilities 
of the same amount in Part One, as shown in table 5.2.14 Huge excess assets 
of Part Two of the balance sheet imply that future generations will be forced 
to pay more in contributions than the anticipated beneﬁ  ts they will receive. 
That is, it is estimated that in aggregate the present value of future beneﬁ  ts 
will be around 80 percent of the present value of future contributions.
It is as if the Japanese government is cutting paper not with scissors but 
with a saw. Younger generations are most likely to intensify their distrust 
against government and the incentive- compatibility issue or drop- out prob-
lem will intensify. The management lobby (Nippon Keidanren) and trade 
unions (Rengo) both oppose any further increases of more than 15 percent-
age points in the KNH contribution rate.
5.5.7      A Declining Replacement Rate
As noted before, those who are already receiving their pensions will see 
their beneﬁ  ts decline in real terms by an average 0.9 percentage points per 
year. The government scenario sees consumer prices eventually rising 1.0 
percent a year and take- home pay by 2.1 percent a year. This means that the 
Table 5.2  Balance sheet of the KNH after reform as of 31 March 2005
      Trillion yen 
1. Part one
Assets
  Financial  reserves 170
    Transfers from general revenue 150
Liabilities




  Contributions 1,200
    Transfers from general revenue 190
Liabilities
    Pensions due to future contributions 970
  Excess assets   420  
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare Japan, The 2005 Financial Recalculation of the 
KNH, 2004 (in Japanese).
14. Assumptions in table 5.2 are the same as those described in section 5.4 in this chapter. 
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typical beneﬁ  ciary who begins receiving 233,000 yen a month at age sixty-
 ﬁ ve in 2004 will get roughly 240,000 yen at age eighty-  four in 2023; in other 
words, nominal beneﬁ  ts will remain virtually unchanged for two decades, 
despite the fact that average take-  home pay of the working population is 
projected to have risen by over 40 percent. The income replacement rate, 
which stood at nearly 60 percent at age sixty- ﬁ  ve, will dwindle to 43 percent 
by the time the typical recipient turns eighty-  four. The promise of beneﬁ  ts 
in excess of 50 percent of take-  home pay does not apply, therefore, to those 
who are already on old-  age pensions.
5.5.8      Automatic Balance Mechanism: Still Incomplete
The so-  called demographic factors are likely to continue changing for 
the foreseeable future. The government itself foresees the number of par-
ticipants in public pension plans declining over the coming century. The es-
timated ﬁ  gure of 69.4 million participants in 2005 is expected to fall to 
61.0 million in 2025, 45.3 million in 2050, and 29.2 million in 2100. This 
corresponds to an average annual decline of 0.6 percent through 2025, 1.2 
percent of the quarter century from 2025, and 0.9 percent for the half cen-
tury from 2050. In other words, the decline in the number of workers who 
are ﬁ  nancially supporting the public pension system will continue for many 
decades.
The 2004 reforms, however, adjust beneﬁ  t levels in line with the decline in 
the contribution- paying population for the next twenty years only; the gov-
ernment’s “standard case” does not foresee any further downward revisions, 
even if the number of participants continues to fall. If the government really 
anticipates an ongoing decline in participation, there is no good reason to 
abruptly stop adjusting beneﬁ  t levels after a certain period of time.15
The decision to keep the typical income replacement rate at 50 percent at 
the point when pension payments commence represents, in eﬀect, the adop-
tion of a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t formula. Maintaining both ﬁ  xed contributions on 
the one hand and deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t levels on the other is not an easy task, as 
there is little room to deal with unforeseen developments. The government 
will be confronted with a ﬁ  scal emergency should its projections for growth 
in contributions and a reversal in the falling birth rate veer widely from the 
underlying assumptions.
For example, the government has based its population ﬁ  gures on the Janu-
ary 2002 projections of the NIPSSR. Under these projections, the medium 
variant for the total fertility rate (the average number of childbirths per 
woman) falls to 1.31 in 2007, after which it begins climbing, reaching 1.39 
in 2050 and 1.73 in 2100. Actual ﬁ  gures since the projections were released 
15. The replacement rate at 50 percent can be regarded as still too high, since many people 
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have been slightly lower than this variant, and there are no signs whatsoever 
that the fertility rate will stop declining in 2007.
5.5.9      The Normal Pensionable Age
If the government is to keep its promise on an upper limit for contribu-
tions and a lower limit for beneﬁ  ts, the only policy option it will have in the 
event of a ﬁ  nancial shortfall will be to raise the age at which people begin 
receiving beneﬁ  ts. The reform package makes no mention of such a pos-
sibility; policymakers no doubt chose to simply put this task oﬀ to a future 
date.16
5.5.10      Increasing Transfers from General Revenue—Why?
By FY 2009 the share of the basic pension beneﬁ  ts funded by the national 
treasury will be raised from one-  third to one-  half. This means that more 
taxes will be used to cover the cost of beneﬁ  ts. Taxes are by nature diﬀerent 
from contributions paid by participants in speciﬁ  c pension plans, and there 
is a need to reconsider the beneﬁ  ts that are to be funded by tax revenues.
The leaders of Japanese industry tend to be quite advanced in years. For 
the most part, they are over the age of sixty-  ﬁ  ve, which means that they are 
qualiﬁ  ed to receive the ﬂ  at- rate basic pension. Even though they are among 
the wealthiest people in the country, they are entitled to the same basic 
pension as other older people hovering around the poverty line. Using tax 
revenues to ﬁ  nance a bigger share of the basic pension essentially means 
asking taxpayers to foot a bigger bill for the beneﬁ  ts of wealthy households 
as well. For an elderly couple, the tax- ﬁ  nanced portion of the basic pension 
will rise from 530,000 yen a year to 800,000 yen. If a need arises to raise taxes 
at a future date, who will then actually agree to pay more? Few people will 
be willing to tolerate such wasteful uses of tax revenue.
5.6      Future Policy Options in Social Security Pensions
There are ﬁ  ve major policy options discussed in Japan, as follows.
5.6.1      Option 1: Privatizing the Second-  Tier Earnings-  Related Pension
The background for privatization is that too many promises have been 
made on social security pensions and their downsizing is required. Japan 
Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyu Kai) proposes a priva-
tization of the earnings-  related portion, paying oﬀ the reduced earned en-
titlement by around 30 to 40 percent. The proportion of this reduction is to 
be decided by the remaining funded reserve of the KNH.
16. Raising the normal pensionable age will be implemented for ﬁ  nancial reasons as in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, even though it might not be socially accept-
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The proposed payoﬀ scheme is unpopular, however. It is still an open 
question how to make the privatization politically feasible.
5.6.2      Option 2: A Move to a Fully-  Funded Plan
Many economists in Japan believe that any Pay- As- You- Go pension pro-
gram is ﬁ  nancially vulnerable to an aging population with declining fertility. 
They recommend a move to a mandated fully- funded pension plan to avoid 
the demographic risks (see Hatta and Oguchi [1992] for an example).
Others say, however, that it is not  the  Pay- As- You- Go  program  but the 
deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t (DB) plan that is ﬁ  nancially fragile under demographic 
changes. The KNK (Kosei Nenkin Kikin), a typical occupational DB pen-
sion plan, which enables a contracted-  out from social security pensions 
in Japan, faced a huge ﬁ  nancial risk after the bubble burst in the 1990s. It 
turned quite unpopular and a majority of them have been abolished since 
then. Any move to a fully-  funded DB plan can no longer promise sound 
ﬁ  nancing.
5.6.3      Option 3: A Switch to Universal Pensions
The drop-  out problem is getting more and more serious in recent Japan. 
The elderly receiving no social security pension beneﬁ  ts were 420,000 per-
sons in January 2007, and the number will increase to 1.18 million in the near 
future. Those elderly with a smaller monthly amount of pension beneﬁ  ts of 
less than 30,000 Japanese yen amounted to 1.03 million in number, and 90 
percent of them were female (see Takayama [2009] for more details).
In order to overcome these diﬃculties, the Democratic Party, Nippon 
Keidanren, Rengo, members from the private sector of the National Council 
on Economic and Fiscal Policy, Japan, and Nikkei newspaper group have 
proposed to shift from the current contribution-  based basic pension to a 
universal pension, which is wholly ﬁ  nanced by taxes.
Figure 5.2 illustrates changes in net burdens among diﬀerent cohorts 
through this shift. In estimating these changes, it is assumed17 that (a) a uni-
versal pension is to be introduced in 2007; (b) its beneﬁ  t level is the same as 
that of the current ﬂ  at- rate basic pension; (c) the ﬂ  at- rate monthly contribu-
tions of 14,100 Japanese yen per person for nonemployees are abolished and 
the employees’ portion of the KNH contributions (around 7.5 percent of 
their annual salaries) is reduced by 5.0 percentage points, while the employ-
ers’ portion of the KNH contributions remains unchanged; (d) instead, an 
earmarked consumption-  based tax of around 4.3 percent is newly intro-
duced to ﬁ  nance the universal pension on a fully Pay- As- You- Go basis; and 
17. See Takayama and Miyake (2008) for more details on the assumptions and estimating 
procedures here. The National Council on Social Security, Japan (2008) made a diﬀerent esti-
mate, assuming that both employees’ and their employers’ portions of the KNH contributions 
are reduced by the same percentage points. The eﬀects of the switch on the balance sheet remain 
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(e) the tax base is 90 percent of the total consumption expenditure. A typical 
life course is assumed, as well. That is, a man starts working as an employee 
at age twenty, continuing working until age sixty-  ﬁ  ve when he begins to 
receive pension beneﬁ  ts, and dies at age eighty. At age thirty, he marries a 
woman, four years younger, who becomes a full-  time housewife, without 
divorcing until his death. His wife lives longer, dying at age eighty-  ﬁ  ve.
Unless the shift of the aforementioned ﬁ  nancing sources takes place, the 
contribution rate of the KNH will gradually rise from around 15 percent in 
2007 to 18.3 percent by 2017. With these increases in pension contributions, 
the younger the cohort, the heavier his or her lifetime burdens after 2007. 
Needless to say, current elderly people age sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over will not incur 
any additional pension burdens in this setting.
The alternative ﬁ  nancing shift to a universal pension brings a varying 
eﬀect on pension burdens among diﬀerent cohorts. Current pensioners will 
be forced to cover additional burdens of the newly introduced earmarked 
consumption-  based tax, whereas the younger cohorts born after around 
1955 can enjoy some net decreases in pension burdens through the switch of 
ﬁ  nancing sources from contributions to consumption-  based tax. The over-
all net lifetime impact will be increased burdens for everybody, as is shown 
in ﬁ  gure 5.2, although the ﬁ  nancing shift to a consumption-  based tax will 
induce smoother increases in pension burdens among diﬀerent cohorts.
Any increases in social security burdens on the current elderly still look 
politically hard in Japan. Without these changes, however, their children 
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and grandchildren will surely be forced to bear much heavier burdens for 
social security.
If we want to minimize increases in the consumption- based tax, it is worth 
considering a Canadian type of the clawback scheme, which is applied to 
pension beneﬁ  ciaries with a higher income.
5.6.4      Option 4: A Move to Notional Deﬁ  ned Contribution
The Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare has shown a great 
interest in switching the pension system to an NDC (notional deﬁ  ned con-
tribution) arrangement. It has indicated, however, that it does not consider 
such a switch to be realistic until the KNH contribution rate reaches its 
peak level in 2017.
However, switching to an NDC arrangement can be introduced in Japan 
sooner, if we separate the “legacy pension” problem from the issue of re-
building a sustainable pension system for the future.
The legacy pension problem is equivalent to sunk costs in the economic 
perspective. It can be solved not by increasing the KNH contribution 
rate but by introducing a new tax—for example, a 3.2 percent earmarked 
consumption- based tax and intensive interjection of the increased transfers 
from general revenue.18 Needless to say, the current generous beneﬁ  ts can 
also be reduced more or less by the same percentage in the aggregate level, 
as implemented in the 2004 pension reform.
As far as Part Two of the balance sheet that relates to future contributions 
and promised pension beneﬁ  ts entitled by future contributions is concerned, 
a switch to the NDC is possible. The KNH contribution rate can be kept 
unchanged at around current 15 percentage points. As well, the notional rate 
of return may be endogenous, following a Swedish-  type automatic balance 
mechanism.
Importantly, with the NDC plan, the incentive-  compatibility problem 
can be avoided. Indeed, every dollar counts in the NDC, and this would be 
the most important element of a switch to an NDC plan. It will be demon-
strated to the public that everybody gets a pension equivalent to his or her 
own contribution payments.19
Further, an NDC plan is expected to be rather neutral to the retirement 
decision. The labor force participation rate for Japanese elderly males still 
remains at a considerably high level (70.9 percent in 2006 for those age sixty 
to sixty-  four) as compared with other developed countries. The shift to 
NDC arrangements can also induce later retirement in Japan, but its eﬀect 
may not be so signiﬁ  cant.
18. In the NDC plan stated previously, the balance sheet will turn healthy. Alternatively, a 2 
percent earmarked consumption tax might be alright, since the remaining excess liabilities of 
90 trillion yen may be acceptable as a “hidden” national debt.
19. See Könberg (2002), Palmer (2003) and Settergren (2001) for more details. The NDC is 
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A move to NDC may lead to lower replacement rates at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve. 
However, this can be compensated by working longer (to age sixty- seven or 
so), or by more voluntary saving.
While not explicitly considering NDC arrangements, the Japanese gov-
ernment has signaled increased support of ﬁ  nancial deﬁ  ned contributions 
(FDC) arrangements by deciding to give more tax incentives to the existing 
deﬁ  ned contribution plan from October 2004 onward.20
5.6.5      Option 5: Introducing a Minimum Guaranteed Pension
The NDC does not suﬃce, however, when we also need to take account 
of social adequacy.
One way to resolve this problem is to introduce a minimum guaranteed 
pension, as the Yomiuri Group suggests. The National Council of Social 
Security, Japan (2008) estimated the cost of introducing such a pension with 
income testing. According to the estimate, the cost will be around 1.0 trillion 
yen, looking politically more feasible than other options. It remains a future 
task to specify the provision of income testing and tax sources, earmarking, 
or general revenue.21
An evidence-  based policy decision is recommended. There remains a lot 
of empirical research before the Japanese adopt wise and appropriate policy 
measures for the future.
5.7    Concluding  Remarks
The December 2006 release of future population projections by the 
NIPSSR made social security ﬁ  nancing more serious. The majority of the 
population has recognized the gravity of the problem. The Japanese can 
forgive and forget.
Socioeconomic conditions will change very rapidly. The changes that take 
place will often be beyond our expectations. Neverending reforms of social 
security are inevitable in Japan, where only ﬁ  ne- tuning of programs even in 
the face of changing circumstances is acceptable in the political arena.
The Japanese are increasingly concerned with the “taste of pie” rather 
than the “size of pie” or the “distribution of pie.” When it comes to social 
security pensions, the most important question is whether or not they are 
worth buying. It has become a secondary concern how big or how fair they 
are. Despite the comprehensive 2004 reforms, many issues remain. In partic-
ular, the basic design of the pension program has to be incentive- compatible. 
Contributions must be much more directly linked with old- age pension ben-
20. Mandating a partial FDC can be an option, when the KNH beneﬁ  t level is further 
reduced.
21. The eﬀects of introducing a minimum guaranteed pension on the balance sheet remain 
to be studied in the future. Another option is to raise the returns on the Government Pension 
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eﬁ  ts, while an element of social adequacy should be incorporated in a sepa-
rate tier of pension beneﬁ  ts ﬁ  nanced by sources other than contributions.
Traditionally, the current (and projected future) income statement has 
been the major tool for describing the ﬁ  nancial performance of social secu-
rity pensions all over the world. It can only give half the story, however. 
Financial sustainability of social security pensions is often unattained even 
if its income statement enjoys a surplus. The balance sheet approach is 
now an indispensable tool for people to understand the long-  run ﬁ  nancial 
sustainability of social security pensions and to evaluate varying ﬁ  nancial 
impacts of diﬀerent reform alternatives. This chapter provides a typical ex-
ample of applying the balance sheet approach to analyzing social security 
pensions.
Balance sheet of social security pensions in the United States, Sweden, 
Germany, Spain, Korea, Singapore, and China have also been available for 
some time. This approach could be useful for future policy developments 
around the world.
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Comment  Worawan Chandoevwit
Takayama’s chapter describes pension reforms and ﬁ  nancial performance of 
pension systems in Japan. The chapter explains details of pension reform in 
2004, assuming that readers have some background on the Japanese pension 
system and contemporary disputes on the reforms. It is worth clarifying the 
pension system in Japan as it is unique and helps readers understand this 
chapter easily. Therefore, in this comment, I will elaborate more on pension 
systems in Japan and discuss policy options.
For social security (pension and health care) administrative purposes, 
residents of Japan aged between twenty and sixty are grouped into three 
categories as follows.
Category I: Self- employed, students, and all registered residents aged twenty 
to sixty years excluding categories II and III. About 30 percent of the 
insured population are in this category.
Category II: Salaried employees in the private sector, central and local gov-
ernment employees, and private school teachers and employees in private 
schools. Over 50 percent of the insured population are in this category.
Category III: Dependent spouse of category II (aged twenty to sixty).
Japan also has a separate occupation based on social insurance system for 
seamen because they do not fall into these three categories.
The public pension system in Japan can be characterized as a universal 
and deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t system. Pension is composed of basic pension (or Na-
tional Pension) and income- related  pension.
National Pension (Kokumin Nenkin) is operated by municipalities and 
is called a regional-  based pension. Everybody is entitled to basic pension, 
provided that they have paid premium for a certain period. The system is 
called a Pay-  As-  You-  Go (PAYGO) ﬂ  at rate beneﬁ  t system. The pension 
includes ﬁ  ve types of beneﬁ  ts: old- age, disability, survivor, widow, and death 
beneﬁ  t. Those who receive disability basic pension or public assistance are 
exempted from paying contribution. Students and low income workers can 
postpone their contribution for some periods. An important issue of the 
National Pension is its coverage. Because of the aging population, the num-
ber of working age population who distrust the public pension system has 
increased. In 2002, the number of delinquent contributors rose by 8.3 mil-
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